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Creeping acquisitions refer to the purchase of company shares by its investors (usually, promoters or
shareholders with signiﬁcant holdings) over a number of small transactions, so as to increase the investors'
stake in the company by an economically signiﬁcant amountwithout requiring any disclosure or other action
by the investors. Thus, creeping acquisitions allow promoters (principal owners) to increase their stakes in
ﬁrms by up to the maximum amount allowed under the prevailing securities regulations without triggering
the need for any action mandated by the regulators.
In this paper, we analyze the extent to which promoters of ﬁrms listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange
(“BSE”) may be using rights issues to increase their stakes in ﬁrms, circumventing regulatory provisions re-
garding creeping acquisitions in the process. We ﬁnd strong evidence that promoters of Indian ﬁrms could
be using rights issues as a mechanism for increasing their stakes, and this is particularly true for ﬁrms belong-
ing to Indian business groups, which are a collection of publicly traded ﬁrms spread across industries with: +1 212 492 8188.
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stakes similar to the ones observed related to rights issues would otherwise have triggered disclosure and
open offers per the regulatory norms.
The Indian securities markets are primarily regulated by the Securities and Exchange Board of India
(“SEBI”), established in 1992 to “protect the interests of investors in securities and to promote the develop-
ment of, and to regulate, the securities market” (SEBI, n.d.). Over the years, SEBI has taken several steps to im-
prove disclosures by ﬁrms and corporate governance. Prominent among these are formation of: theMalegam
Committee in 1995 to reviewdisclosure requirements for public and rights issues that resulted in the SEBI Dis-
closure and Investor Protection Guidelines, 2000 (“DIP guidelines”) (Malegam, 2004); the Bhagwati Commit-
tee in 1995 (and later, in 2001) to review regulations surrounding substantial acquisitions and takeovers that
resulted in the Substantial Acquisitions of Shares and Takeovers Regulations (“Takeover Code”) in 1997; and
the KumarMangalamBirla Committee (“KMBC”) in 1999 to identify steps to, among other aims, improve dis-
closures of ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial information to investors, and suggest a code of corporate governance
practices that resulted in introduction of Clause 49 in the Listing Agreement of the Stock Exchanges in 2000.2
SEBI's primary motivations for enacting these regulations have been to improve protection of minority
shareholders and improve corporate governance standards in the Indian ﬁnancial market. For example, a
key concern of the Takeover Code was to ensure that minority shareholders don't lose proﬁtable exit oppor-
tunities in the event of a change in control through privately negotiated acquisitions, particularly in a business
environment of mergers and acquisitions involving foreign companies. SEBI's focus on corporate governance
is consistent with studies that have identiﬁed various beneﬁts of improvement in corporate governance. For
example, a cross-country study by La Porta et al. (2002) ﬁnds that ﬁrms in countries with better protection of
minority shareholders and ﬁrms with higher cash-ﬂow ownership by the controlling shareholder have rela-
tively higher valuations. Further, better protection of outside shareholders is also associated with more valu-
able stock markets (La Porta et al., 1997), greater dividend payouts (La Porta et al., 2000), and higher
correlation between investment opportunities and actual investments (Wurgler, 2000).
However, SEBI's regulations related to rights issues seem to undercut SEBI's regulations concerning creep-
ing acquisitions. In particular, SEBI allows any change in promoters' holdings caused by a rights issue not to
count towards the creeping acquisition limit when computing the maximum amount by which promoters
can increase their stake in the company in a year without triggering public announcement and open offer re-
quirements. Thus, it is likely that promotersmay use rights issues to increase their stake and thus circumvent
rules related to creeping acquisitions. Such attempts to increase promoter shareholding through rights issue
could bemotivated by, amongothers, a desire to recoup a reduction in promoter shareholding in years leading
up to the rights issue. We investigate this possibility in the paper.
We also document that the rights issues are being offered at a substantial discount (relative to prevailing
market prices) to shareholders. In theory, the discount should provide an incentive to minority shareholders
to participate in a rights issue in order to realize proﬁts by subscribing to the issue, acquiring shares at a dis-
count, and subsequently selling shares at the market price. We posit that market frictions such as taxes and
transaction costs may be limiting investors' ability to realize short-term gains associated with subscribing
to a rights issue and then subsequently selling the rights shares.
We show that rights-issuing ﬁrms underperform similar non-rights-issuing companies. The
underperformance is both statistically and economically signiﬁcant. This is especially true for ﬁrms that un-
dertake rights issues primarily to augment theirworking capital or retire debt (i.e., ﬁrmswith non-speciﬁc ob-
jectives for the rights issues).
Our ﬁndings should concern policy makers like SEBI, because the ability of promoters to increase their
stakes in ﬁrms, especially at prices below the market value of the stock of the rights-issuing company, is det-
rimental to the interests of minority shareholders, the very constituency that SEBI intends to protect. In-
creased promoter ownership concentrates more cash ﬂow and voting rights in the hands of the promoters,
potentially allowing them tomake decisions that are disadvantageous to theminority shareholders. Increased
promoter shareholding concentration through dilutive share issues has beendeﬁned as a form of tunneling by
Johnson et al. (2000). In particular, Johnson et al. (2000) state that “the controlling shareholder can increase2 See http://www.sebi.gov.in/circulars/2003/cir2803.html for reference.
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trading, creeping acquisitions, or other ﬁnancial transactions that discriminate against minorities.” Further-
more, Bertrand et al. (2002) have shown that there is signiﬁcant tunneling— transfer of resources by control-
ling shareholders across ﬁrms within a group— in ﬁrms belonging to business groups in India. The existence
of tunneling is likely to exacerbate the adverse impact of increased promoter ownership on the interests of the
minority shareholders.
To our knowledge, our paper is the ﬁrst to explore the possible connection between rights issues and pro-
moter shareholding. We provide evidence that promoters of Indian ﬁrms could be using rights issues as a
mechanism to increase their shareholding, and that this might be related to gaining control. We demonstrate
the underperformance of rights-issuing ﬁrms, and in particular the underperformance of ﬁrms that do not
provide “speciﬁc” objectives in connection with the rights issues relative to a matched sample of similar
ﬁrms. Our paper also explores the possibility that there are signiﬁcant transaction costs involved in trading
certain shares, which create barriers to fully exploiting pricing anomalies.
Wemake several contributions to the literature. Our paper is tied to Eckbo andMasulis (1992), who propose
a theoretical model that frames the ﬂotation method choice regarding how to issue additional equity based on
the cost of issuance and expectations regarding shareholder take-up of the rights issue— i.e., the extent towhich
existing shareholders participate in the rights issue. We also contribute to the literature that examines how
ﬁrms choose to raise equity, for example, Bøhren et al. (1997), Wu (2004), and Cronqvist and Nilsson (2005).
We extend the literature that studies rights issues. Among the papers that study rights issues in other con-
texts, Marisetty et al. (2008) ﬁnd evidence that price reaction to a rights issue is signiﬁcantly negative for
group-afﬁliated ﬁrms compared to stand-alone ﬁrms, and Marisetty and Subrahmanyam (2010) ﬁnd evi-
dence of greater underpricing of IPOs of Indian group-afﬁliated ﬁrms. By examining the extent to which
group afﬁliation could play a role in a ﬁrm's decision to issue equity via a rights issue, we contribute to the lit-
erature on group afﬁliations of ﬁrms and its impact on corporate governance (and consequently, minority
shareholders), ﬁrm performance andﬁrmvalue. Khanna and Palepu (2000) report that afﬁliates of diversiﬁed
business groups outperform stand-alone ﬁrms in the same industry.
Finally, we contribute to the discussion on how interests ofminority shareholdersmay be compromised in
India as a consequence of loopholes in regulations. Taken as a whole, our paper contributes towards a better
understanding of the interplay of institutional features and ownership characteristics of ﬁrms in emerging
markets that may aid in policy formations regarding corporate governance issues.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section provides details of the SEBI regulations that
govern rights issues and creeping acquisitions.Wediscuss some salient features of Indian rights issues, aswell
as SEBI guidelines regarding rights issues and substantial acquisitions, and document how the frequency of
rights issues by Indian ﬁrms have responded to variations in regulations regarding creeping acquisitions. In
Section 3, we develop and present our hypotheses. Section 4 describes our data and empirical approach
and discusses the results. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Overview of rights issues and creeping acquisitions
2.1. Characteristics of rights issues in India
A rights issue is a seasoned equity offering in which the issuing ﬁrm solicits investments from existing
shareholders of a company via short-lived warrants issued on a pro rata basis (Eckbo and Masulis, 1992). A
rights issue sold to existing shareholders could be with or without commitment from underwriters to pur-
chase all unsubscribed shares. Alternatively, a company may issue additional equity via a ﬁrm commitment
underwritten offer, in which equity is sold to investors in general; we will refer to these as seasoned equity
offerings. Rights offerings are still relatively popular outside theUS, and this popularity is linked to family con-
trol of public companies in Europe and East Asian countries (Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2005).
SEBI's Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Securities Market 2008 shows that both the number of rights is-
sues and the amount raised through rights issues have varied over time. SEBI has attributed the variance in
issuance to, among others, increasing reliance on private placements, changes in economic conditions and
changes in investor sentiment (SEBI, 1998). For example, in 1993, there were 370 rights issues by ﬁrms listed
in India, raising Rs. 89 billion, but in 2002, there were only 12 rights issues that raised an aggregate of Rs. 4
billion, and in 2006, there were 39 rights issues raising Rs. 37 billion. The data on rights issues also show
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2007was 32,which is similar to the number for 2006. However, the amount raised in 2007wasRs. 325 billion,
which is over 8 times the amount raised in 2006. A review of the rights issues in 2006 and 2007 shows that in
2007 there were 3 issues that alone raised over Rs. 250 billion. In general, rights issues continue to be an im-
portant source of equity capital for Indian companies, and from1993 through 2008 they accounted for about a
third of the equity capital raised by ﬁrms.
The process of initiating a rights issue is fairly straightforward. Board approval is sufﬁcient to initiate a
rights issue, as long as the ﬁrm seeks to issue shares such that the total number of shares outstanding subse-
quent to the rights issue will not exceed the number of shares the ﬁrm is authorized to issue per its articles of
association (i.e., charter). In addition, ﬁrms are required to notify the relevant stock exchanges about the de-
cision to convene a board meeting for purposes of considering a rights issue, and ﬁrms are then also required
to inform the relevant stock exchanges about the particulars of the rights issue soon after its board approves
the offering. Changes in the authorized capital of a ﬁrm can be made via a general or special resolution, as
mandated by a ﬁrm's charter.
A few features of rights issues by Indian companies are noteworthy. In almost all cases, rights issues by
Indian ﬁrms are not underwritten by investment banks, but are underwritten by the promoters themselves.
That is, the promoters promise to subscribe to any shortfall in the uptake of the rights by the retail share-
holders. Additionally, Indian rights issues are priced at a considerable discount to the prevailing market
price of the issuing company's shares, which contrasts with seasoned equity offerings in Europe and the US.
For example, seasoned equity offerings between 1990 and 1998 in the USwere priced at an average discount
of 2.9% (Corwin, 2003), while the average discount on Indian rights issues is quite large, as we document
below.
Fig. 1 shows that for the period of 2002 through 2008, rights issues were offered at average prices that
were between 11 and 43% below the issuing ﬁrm's stock price on the corresponding ex-rights date (a detailed11%
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Fig. 1. Average discounts offered by rights-issuing Indian companies.
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rights issues is comparable to discounts in private placements of equities in the US. For example, Hertzel
and Smith (1993) report average discounts of 20% in private placements. Given the extant research on infor-
mation asymmetry and the ﬁnancing hierarchy (e.g., Myers and Majluf, 1984), Indian rights issues pose a bit
of a puzzle. In particular, the theory concerning the ﬁnancing hierarchy suggests that ﬁrms choose rights of-
ferings at relatively low levels of asymmetric information about the value of the ﬁrm, and opt formore expen-
sive private placements at relatively high levels of asymmetric information concerning ﬁrm value (Cronqvist
andNilsson, 2005). However, in India,whileﬁrms' choices of raising capital through rights issues seem to sug-
gest a relatively low level of asymmetric information concerning the value of the issuing ﬁrms, the pricing of
the rights issues, on the other hand, seems to suggest high levels of asymmetric information.
One explanation for the observed discount could be that the discount is offered to offset some of the costs
that shareholders are likely to bear in order to participate in the rights offering. Hansen et al. (1986) identiﬁed
taxes, transaction costs and liquidity costs as possible impediments to participation in a rights issue. Given
that rights issues in India, in general, are underwritten by the promoters, a discount does serve as an incentive
for minority shareholders to participate. Later in the paper we show that discounts are positively related to
shareholder participation.
A review of articles in the Indian business press about rights issues suggests that ﬁrmsmay use rights issues
as a way to reward shareholders. For example, a few articles state that one of the objectives of issuing ﬁrms is to
reward shareholders with “robust” discounts.3 However, we do not ﬁnd any strong evidence in our sample that
supports the notion that rights issues are used to reward shareholders.2.2. SEBI guidelines for rights issues
SEBI requires that ﬁrms seeking to issue equity via Initial Public Offerings or Further Public Offerings must
meet certain proﬁtability and/or capitalization thresholds. However, ﬁrms seeking to issue equity on a rights
basis do not need to meet any such thresholds as per clause 2.4.1(iv) of the DIP guidelines. For instance, infor-
mation provided on the SEBI website states that:3 See
market
a senior
busines
4 “FreSEBI has laid down eligibility norms for entities accessing the primary market through public issues.
There is no eligibility norm for a listed company making a rights issue as it is an offer made to the
existing shareholders who are expected to know their company. There are no eligibility norms for a
listed company making a preferential issue.4In addition to having no eligibility criteria, in 2009 SEBI removed certain disclosure requirements to make it
easier and cheaper for ﬁrms to complete rights issues. Earlier, the disclosure requirements for rights issueswere
almost as exhaustive as for public issues. SEBI rationalized new disclosure requirements based on the assump-
tion that “certain informationabout the entities [rights-issuingﬁrms] that are listed and tradedon the exchanges
is available in the public domain for investors” (SEBI, 2009). Implicit in SEBI's basis for reducing disclosure
requirements is the assumption that high-quality disclosures are available to investors of listed companies,
which may not be the case (Parekh, 2009). SEBI has also introduced changes that make it possible for ﬁrms to
utilize funds available from rights issues faster. For example, revised section 8.19.1 in the DIP guidelines now
allows ﬁrms to utilize the proceeds from the rights issue as soon as the basis of allotment is ﬁnalized.
One beneﬁt of having no eligibility criteria is that there is no direct incentive for rights-issuing ﬁrms to
manage earnings. For example, regulators in China have set speciﬁc thresholds for Return on Assets (ROA)
that ﬁrms must satisfy to be eligible to issue equity on a rights basis, and researchers have found evidence
of substantial earningsmanagement surrounding rights issues (Chen andYuan, 2004; Liu and Lu, 2007). How-
ever, the lack of entry norms or reduction of disclosure requirements can also lead to potentially adverse, for instance, http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/15-sbi-rights-at-35-discount/310732/, “‘We are coming to the
after 14 years. We have not given our shareholders any bonus shares, so we have decided to give them a robust discount,’ said
SBI ofﬁcial.” See also article by R. Jagannathan: “Rewarding shareholder right,” December 28, 2004, available at http://www.
s-standard.com/india/news/r-jagannathan-rewarding-shareholders-right/204534/.
quently Asked Questions on Issues and use of ECS for Refunds— For Reference Only” http://www.sebi.gov.in/faq/pubissuefaq.pdf, p. 2.
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have adequate information based on the public disclosures of the ﬁrms issuing equity on a rights basis is typ-
ically not supported by studies of the quality of disclosures. These studies have found that while India receives
high marks for investor protection and creditor rights, its record in practice is poor (Allen et al., 2012). Simi-
larly, Chakrabarti et al. (2008) state that while ﬁnancial disclosure norms in India are superior to those of
most Asian countries, noncompliancewith the disclosure norms is rampant. Other cross-country studies of in-
vestor protection also rank India low. For example, La Porta et al. (1998) ﬁnd that among 18 countries follow-
ing a Common Law legal system, India ranks lower than average on a set of criteria that include shareholder
rights, creditor rights, rule of law and concentration of ownership. Therefore, the impact of the recent changes
in SEBI DIP guidelines reducing disclosure requirements for rights-issuing ﬁrms remains to be seen.2.3. SEBI guidelines for creeping acquisitions
Asmentioned above, the Takeover Code governs, among others, the percentage amount bywhich the pro-
moters of a ﬁrm can increase their holdings via purchases in the secondary market. One of the stated objec-
tives of the Takeover Code is to protect the interest of minority shareholders (Kumar, 2000). Table 1 shows
selected regulations related to creeping acquisitions from 1997 through 2008. As shown in the table, the reg-
ulations have changed several times. The changes, in general, reﬂect an attempt by SEBI to balance the twin
objectives of protecting the interests of minority shareholders and the ease with which mergers and acquisi-
tions can take place to promote economic growth, particularly in a changing global economy (Kumar, 2000;
SEBI, 2008).
Changes in regulations since 2008 have not signiﬁcantly altered the rules regarding creeping acquisitions.
For example, in 2009 the existing regulation that allowed creeping acquisition of 5% a year for promoters with
ownership stakes of between 15% and 75%was changed such that promoters with stakes of between 15% and
55% were allowed to acquire up to 5% of their ﬁrms' stake in a year. For companies with promoter
shareholdings between 55 and 75%, a one-time (i.e., not annual) cumulative creeping acquisition limit of 5%
is allowed (Regulations 11(2) and 11(2A) of the Takeover Code).Table 1
Selected changes in regulations related to creeping acquisitions.
Year Change in regulation Sources
Feb-97 Creeping acquisitions of up to 2% allowed, beyond which an open offer is necessary if the initial promoter
shareholding is between 10 and 51%. Beyond 51%, no open offer necessary.
[1]
Oct-98 Creeping acquisitions of up to 5% allowed if the initial shareholding is between 15 and 75%. [2]
Oct-01 Creeping acquisitions of up to 10% allowed if the initial shareholding is between 15 and 75%. Purchase or
sale of shares aggregating 2% or more needs to be disclosed.
[3]
Sep-02 Creeping acquisitions of 5% allowed if the initial shareholding is between 15 and 75%. Purchase or sale
of shares aggregating 2% or more needs to be disclosed.
[4]
Mar-05 Creeping acquisitions of 5% allowed if the initial shareholding is between 15 and 55%. Beyond 55% but
below 75%, no creeping acquisitions are allowed. Purchase or sale of shares aggregating 2% or more
needs to be disclosed.
[5]
Oct-08 Creeping acquisitions of up to 5% allowed if the initial shareholding is between 15 and 75%. Purchase
or sale of shares aggregating 2% or more needs to be disclosed.
[6]
Sources:
[1] SEBI (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers) Regulations, 1997.
[2] SEBI (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers) (Amendment) Regulations, 1998, w.e.f. 28-10-98.
[3] SEBI (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers) (Third Amendment) Regulations, 2001, w.e.f., 24-10-2001.
[4] SEBI (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers) (Second Amendment) Regulations, 2002, w.e.f. 9-9-2002.
[5] SEBI (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers) (Amendment) Regulations, 2005, w.e.f. 3-1-2005.
[6] SEBI (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers) (Amendment) Regulations, 2008, w.e.f. 31-10-2008.
Notes:
Changes in regulations related to creeping acquisitions are contained in regulations 11(1), 11(2), 11(2A). Changes in regulations related
to public disclosure of purchase and sales of shares are contained in regulations 7(1) and 7(1A).
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and 75% could acquire up to 5% of their ﬁrms' equity in any one year without triggering a need for an open
offer.5
Regulations regarding the consequence of breaching the 5% creeping acquisition threshold have also not
changed signiﬁcantly since 1997. Upuntil the 2011, the Takeover Code (paragraph 20.4.1) required that a pro-
moter that breached that creeping acquisition threshold of 5% ownership increase in a year, make an open
offer to acquire an additional 20% of the total outstanding shares at a price that is at least equal to the higher
of (i) the average of the weekly highest and lowest closing price paid by the promoter for the shares of the
given company during a 26-week period, or (ii) the average of the daily high and low prices of the company
during a two-week period ending on the date of announcement of the open offer. Following the recommen-
dations of the Achuthan Committee (the Takeover Regulatory Advisory Committee that was set up by SEBI),
the amount of the open offer was increased from 20% of the outstanding shares to 25% of the outstanding
shares in 2011.
Thus, even after the most recent changes to the Takeover Code, any increase in promoters' ownership
through rights issues is not treated as creeping acquisition. In other words, if subsequent to a rights issue a
promoter's stake increased by, say, 6 percentage points because the promoter subscribed to the shares that
were offered to but not subscribed by minority shareholders, the open offer requirement of the Takeover
Code is not triggered. In India, promoters almost always underwrite their own rights issues (for the period
2002 to 2008 we found only one case where this wasn't true); i.e., they declare in their ﬁlings to SEBI and
other regulators that they will subscribe to additional shares should such opportunities arise due to under-
subscription by other shareholders. The subsequent rise in promoter shareholding does not breach any pro-
visions of the creeping acquisition guidelines, including the aforementioned Regulation 3(1)(b)(ii). Thus, a
rights issue offers a route for promoters to increase shareholding by more than 5% without triggering an
open offer. In Section 4, we examine the extent to which promoters have taken advantage of this apparent
loophole.
2.4. Rights issues under varying creeping acquisition regimes
SEBI has been regularly changing the guidelines concerning creeping acquisition since the late 1990s
(Table 1). A simple way to ascertain whether promoters' decisions to issue equity on a rights basis are, at
least in part, driven by the desire to circumvent Takeover Code regulations related to creeping acquisitions
would be to see if the number of rights issues declines during periods in which regulations allow promoters
to acquire a larger percentage of shares without triggering the need for an open offer.
To that end, the period from April 1999 to October 2008, for which we have data on rights issues on a
monthly basis from SEBI, may be divided into four distinct regulatory regimes. Regime 1 covers the period
from the second quarter of 1999 through the third quarter of 2001. During this period, SEBI allowed compa-
nies with promoter shareholdings between 15 and 75% a creeping acquisition of up to 5%. During Regime 2,
from the fourth quarter of 2001 through the third quarter of 2002, SEBI permitted companies with promoter
shareholdings between 15 and 75% a creeping acquisition of up to 10%. In fact, there are a number of news
articles about promoters taking advantage of the increase in the creeping acquisition limit and increasing
their stake by over 5 percentage points. During Regime 3, from the fourth quarter of 2002 through the ﬁrst
quarter of 2005, SEBI effectively reverted back to Regime 1. Finally, during Regime 4, from the second quarter
of 2005 through October 2008, SEBI has allowed creeping acquisition of up to 5% for promoters with
shareholdings between 15% and 55%. Thus, during Regime 4, promoters with a stake of 55% or more were
not allowed to increase their stakes via creeping acquisitions. Since the secondquarter of 2005, SEBI has issued
a number of clariﬁcations of its regulations related to creeping acquisitions.
Based on our discussion in Section 2.2 above,we expect the number of rights issues to be roughly similar in
Regimes 1 and 3, to be low in Regime2 (because incentives to use rights issue to increase promoter sharehold-
ing reduced due to the 10% creeping acquisition threshold) and to be relatively higher in Regime 4. Fig. 2
charts the number of rights issues by quarter under different regulatory regimes. The number of rights issues
in a quarter ranges from 1 to 15. Fig. 2 shows that the number of rights issues fell markedly during Regime 2.5 See, for instance, “SEBI Accepts Takeover Code, Buyout Trigger Point at 25%,” at http://www.moneycontrol.com/news/market-news/
sebi-accepts-takeover-code-buyout-trigger-point-at-25_570286.html, accessed on Dec 9, 2011.
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moters could increase their stake via creeping acquisitions. The averages are 6 rights issues per quarter in Re-
gime 1, 3.25 rights issues per quarter in Regime 2, 5.7 rights issues per quarter in Regime 3, and 8.53 rights
issues per quarter in Regime 4. This is consistentwith our conjecture: Regimes 1 and 3 are practically identical
in terms of the extent to which promoters could increase their ownership. Regime 2 allowed higher creeping
acquisitions, thus reducing incentives for companies to use rights issues. Regime 4 increased these incentives,
particularly for companies with relatively high promoter shares (55% or more).
The above analysis, although instructive, tells us only about the propensity of listed Indian companies to
raise capital through a rights issue in response to regulatory changes. It does not analyze the changes in pro-
moter shareholdings consequent to a rights issue. In addition, the above analysis does not control for other
factors that could inﬂuence issuance of equity via rights issues. For example, the phenomenon of hot (cold)
markets with respect to equity issuance is well documented, where equity issuance is high (low) in hot
(cold) markets (Bayless and Chaplinski, 1996). In the next section, we develop the conceptual framework
for our analysis and introduce our hypotheses to be tested in our formal data analysis that controls for various
ﬁrm characteristics.3. Hypothesis development
To investigate the extent to which rights issues are undertaken with the objective, albeit unstated, of in-
creasing promoters' ownership in the ﬁrm, we use a multi-step methodology. First, we posit that, in a given
year, rights-issuing companies realize a larger percentage increase in promoters' ownership compared to
the same for similar non-rights-issuing ﬁrms. Such a gain will be consistent with the ﬁrm's objective of
using rights issues to increase promoter shareholding. The expectation that ownership stake of promoters
would increase following a rights issue is consistent with Kothare (1997), who ﬁnds that insider ownership
increases around rights issues, and Holderness and Pontiff (unpublished), who ﬁnd that participation rate
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we ﬁrst establish this claim.
In addition,we expect thatﬁrms belonging to an Indian Business Group aremore likely to have incentives to
increase promoter shareholding through a rights issue, and therefore will register higher increases in promoter
shareholding subsequent to a rights issue compared to stand-alone ﬁrms. Our hypothesis that promoters of
ﬁrms belonging to a business group are more likely to seek an increase in ownership is consistent with the lit-
erature on private beneﬁts of control and tunneling. For exampleWuet al. (in press) posit a rent protection the-
ory to explain decisions regarding equity ﬂotation. Per the rent protection theory, the decision regarding equity
ﬂotation — rights issues verses other methods — is driven by concerns about private beneﬁts of control. With
respect to tunneling, Bertrand et al. (2002) show that Indian business groupﬁrms engage in tunneling, and con-
trol of shareholding rights is crucial to this. Also, as documented by Claessens et al. (2000) and Gopalan and
Jayaraman (2012), business group ﬁrms in East Asia engage more in earnings management linked to private
beneﬁts of control. Thus, it seems reasonable that promoters of ﬁrms belonging to business groups are likely
to be more incentivized to add to their shareholding. We formalize this in the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1A. Rights-issuing ﬁrms experience a greater increase in promoter shareholding compared to
non-rights-issuing ﬁrms in the year of rights issue.
Hypothesis 1B. Rights-issuing companies belonging to business groups experience a greater increase in
promoter shareholding subsequent to the rights issue compared to the stand-alone rights-issuing ﬁrms.
However, the fact that promoters of rights-issuing ﬁrms see a greater increase in ownership stake than
similar non-rights-issuing ﬁrms is not surprising, given that the promoters underwrite the rights issue.
Thus, one cannot draw any conclusion regarding the extent to which the rights issuewas donewith an objec-
tive of increasing the promoter's stake.
To gain insight regarding intent, we ﬁrst examine the evolution of promoter holdings prior to the rights
issue. We conjecture that promoters who experience a reduction in their holdings are likely to be the ones
whowould have an incentive to undertake a rights issue to recoup the loss in ownership. The notion that pro-
moters who experienced a decline in their ownership stake may be the ones seeking to use rights issues as a
mechanism to regain their stake is consistent with the rent protection theory regarding equity issuance (Wu
et al., in press), as well as with Cronqvist and Nilsson (2005), who posit that ﬁrms with greater family control
make issuance decisions in an effort tomaintain their control. The proposed hypothesis is also consistentwith
the literature on business groups and their use of internal capital markets. In less developed capital markets,
ﬁrms in a business group serve as an internal capital market to each other with signiﬁcant intra-group loans
(Gopalan et al., 2007; Khanna andPalepu, 2000),which in turn gives insiders incentives to protect their equity
stake in ﬁrms. Our second hypothesis is stated as:
Hypothesis 2A. Promoters of rights-issuing ﬁrms experience a relatively large reduction in their owner-
ship in years leading up to rights issues. That is, ﬁrms that lose promoter shareholding are more likely to
have a rights issue in subsequent years.
We also examine the cause of the decline in promoter ownership to see if one can gain better insight re-
garding intent. In general, promoter ownership, in percentage terms, can decline because of two reasons —
sale of shares by the promoter, or issuance of shares to other shareholders such as a joint venture partner.
One can think of sale of shares resulting in an absolute reduction of a promoter's holding, while increase in eq-
uity capital results in a relative reduction of the promoters holding (reduction in percentage of shares held
without reduction in number of shares owned or controlled by the promoter). We explore the extent to
which the cause of the decline in promoter holdings, absolute verses relative, can shed additional light on pro-
moters' equity issuance decision. A reduction in promoter ownership due to temporary factors, such as a need
for liquidity, is more likely to manifest as an absolute decline rather than a relative decline in promoter own-
ership. Similarly, a reduction in promoter ownership related to a strategic decision such as issuing shares to,
say, a joint venture partner is likely to manifest as a relative decline in the promoter's ownership rather than
an absolute decline.We conjecture that promoterswho experienced an absolute decline in ownership are like-
ly to be more incentivized to try to gain back the lost stake. Our conjecture is consistent with the literature on
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(Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2005; Wu et al., in press). Thus, we summarize a variation of the second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2B. Firms where promoters have experienced an absolute loss in ownership are likely to be
more incentivized to use a rights issue to try to increase their stake in comparison to ﬁrms where promoters
experience a relative decline in ownership.
We recognize that loss in holdings may not be the only reason that a promoter may be motivated to in-
crease ownership. Other possible reasons, such as achieving the long-term targeted (steady state) ownership
level, could also be a plausible cause for promoters to seek to increase their stake. However, a strong relation-
ship between the decision to do a rights issue and decline in promoter holdings in prior years provides useful
insight regarding intent.
Not all rights-issuingﬁrms are likely to bemotivated by a desire to increase promoter shareholding. In par-
ticular, ﬁrms that need cash infusion to fund speciﬁc projects are unlikely to be motivated by a desire to in-
crease promoter shareholding, and any increase in promoter shareholding is likely to be incidental. Eckbo
and Masulis (1992) model equity ﬂotation method choices made by ﬁrms based on the premise that the
net beneﬁt of the issuance is positive. In otherwords, the difference between the net present value of the pro-
ject being funded with equity and the cost of equity issuance is positive, where the cost of issuance includes
direct and indirect ﬂotation costs. However, to the extent that a ﬁrm is issuing equity with the objective of
helping the promoter increase his stake, one would not expect the Eckbo and Masulis (1992) model to
hold. One way to identify such instances would be to identify rights issues where the funds are not being
raised for a speciﬁc project purpose.
Thus, we look into the objectives of rights issue as described by the ﬁrms in their Letters of Offer to SEBI
(similar to Form S-1 ﬁled in the US) to gain some insight. We apply a simple algorithm to distribute rights is-
sues into two categories. The ﬁrst category includes ﬁrms that provide information on speciﬁc projects. We
categorize the ﬁrst group as one that includes rights issues with “speciﬁc objectives.” The second category in-
cludes rights issues where the company discloses thatmore than 50% of the proceeds from the issuance are to
be used to augment working capital or repay debt (the “non-speciﬁc objectives” category). Our methodology
is consistent with the methodology used by Masulis and Korwar (1986), who categorize the planned use of
proceeds of equity issuances by US ﬁrms.We conjecture that the rights issuesmotivated by promoters' desire
to increase their holdings are likely to fall in the second category.We demonstrate our categorization for a few
companies in Table 2. For instance, we categorize the rights issues by Tata Motors Ltd. and Agro Dutch Com-
pany Ltd. as having speciﬁc objectives, whereas those of Balarampur Chini Mills Ltd. and Saregama India Ltd.
are categorized as being non-speciﬁc.
The hypothesis that promoters seeking to increase their ownership via a rights issue may try to do so
with a rights issue with non-speciﬁc objectives is predicated on the assumption that, all else equal, partic-
ipation by minority shareholders in a non-speciﬁc rights issue is likely to be lower. The underlying
assumption is consistent with Jostarndt (2009), who notes that, due to concerns about wealth transfer
from owners to debtors, equity issuances to reduce debt are less likely to be successful. Similarly,
Masulis and Korwar (1986) show that reduction in leverage can signal lower future cash ﬂows. We
formalize our third hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3. A rights issue that has non-speciﬁc objectives will be more strongly correlated with pro-
moter share gains subsequent to the rights issue.
Finally, we examine incentives of promoters who may be seeking to increase their ownership stake
by over 5% in a year. In particular, we expect that promoters with ownership levels close to but under certain
thresholds have a greater incentive to use rights issues as a mechanism to try to orchestrate a 5-percentage-
point ownership increase using a rights issue. We test for two speciﬁc ownership thresholds — 45% and 25%.
The 45% threshold is based on the fact that passage of ordinary resolutions requires greater than 50% of share-
holders to vote in favor. We conjecture that promoters with a stake of at least 45% can increase their stake to
50% via acquisitions in the openmarket (i.e., creeping acquisitions) without worrying about breaching the 5%
threshold that would require an open offer. The 25% threshold is based on the fact that special resolutions in
India require a 75% shareholding, thus owning 25% or more gives the promoter blocking rights or negative
control.
Table 2
Categorization of objectives of rights issues.
Company Year Stated reason for rights issue Amount raised
(Rs. millions)
Categorization
Balrampur Chini
Mills Ltd.
2005 “The objects of the present issue of equity shares are:
1. To augment the long termworking capital resources of the Company
by substituting part of the short term loans taken to meet the working
capital gap with long term funds
2. To meet the expenses of the issue.”
592 Non-speciﬁc
Tata Motors Ltd. 2008 “The Company intends to use the Net Proceeds to fund its investment by
way of contribution in its wholly owned Subsidiary, TML Holdings Pte
Limited, a limited liability company incorporated in Singapore. TML
Holdings Pte Limited would, in turn, make an investment in its wholly
owned subsidiary, JaguarLandRover Limited (a limited liability company
incorporated in England). JaguarLandRover Limited would utilize the
funds to prepay part of the Short Term Bridge Loan (as deﬁned hereinaf-
ter) availed by it to partially fund the purchase consideration for the ac-
quisition of Jaguar Land Rover from Ford.”
40,920 Speciﬁc
Agro Dutch Ltd. 2006 “The present issue of equity shares is being made to:
To expand themushroomgrowing facility from30,000 TPA to 50,000 TPA.
To set up a co-generation plant
To increase the canmanufacturing capacity from 6000 TPA to 12,000 TPA.
To set up additional canning facilities
To set-up IQF unit enabling the company to provide the customers with
frozen products
To meet margin for working capital
To meet rights issue expenses”
370 Speciﬁc
Saregama India
Ltd.
2005 “The objectives of the issue are as follows:
1. To meet the expenses of the Issue
2. To retire borrowings of the Company
3. To create new content (Rs. 80 million)”
240 Non-speciﬁc
Source:
[1] Letters of Offer of the respective companies, available from www.sebi.gov.in.
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4.1. Data
The data for our analysis of rights issues by Indian public companies come from the Prowess database from
the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (“CMIE”). Our initial sample consists of Indian ﬁrms offering rights
issues from ﬁnancial years 2002 through 2008, when Regime 4 ends. We limit our analysis to issuance of rights
shares only — we exclude issuance of rights shares with warrants or issuance of other forms of equity such as
convertible debentures or preferred stock. Out of the initial sample, we drop any instances of rights issues by ﬁ-
nancialﬁrms, such as banks or non-bankﬁnance companies, because for suchﬁrms issuance of equity on a rights
basis may be driven by the need to comply with certain capital adequacy norms set by the Reserve Bank of
India — the Indian central bank.6 In addition, observations for which the amount of money raised or the rights
share ratio (the number of rights shares a shareholder may buy for every share owned as of the ex-rights
date) is not available are excluded as well. We also drop rights issues for which the capital issue date and ex-
rights date differed by more than 365 days, as well as rights issues of less than Rs. 10 million. Next, we merge
the data on rights-issuing ﬁrms with data from Prowess on ﬁrms listed on the BSE, and drop any rights-issuing
ﬁrms not listed with the BSE, which results in a sample of 127 rights issues from 2002 through 2008 out of a
total 192 rights issues during this period (Table 3). The rights-issuing ﬁrms in our sample form a diverse6 Banks in India are required tomaintain a capital adequacy ratio of 9%, per directives of the RBI. For details, please refer to http://www.
rbi.org.in/scripts/NotiﬁcationUser.aspx?Mode=0&Id=1326.
Table 3
Promoter ownership of rights-issuing companies by year.
Year No. of companies Security amount
(Rs. millions)
Discount
(percentage)
Ratio Promoters' share
one year before
(percent)
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
2002 6 (12) 275.30 148.05 11% 6% 0.63 0.63 48% 48%
2003 4 (22) 708.18 294.45 14% 16% 0.68 0.65 49% 50%
2004 16 (26) 344.19 226.60 13% 28% 1.94 0.55 49% 50%
2005 18 (36) 1422.16 245.90 30% 32% 0.44 0.42 49% 50%
2006 32 (39) 1172.83 341.55 43% 43% 0.81 0.63 48% 49%
2007 31 (32) 561.15 227.30 32% 26% 2.37 0.67 48% 49%
2008 20 (25) 3118.01 556.65 35% 28% 0.91 0.44 49% 50%
Total 127 (192)
Source: Prowess database and SEBI.
Notes:
Ratio is deﬁned as the number of shares existing shareholders have the right to buy for each share they own.Discount is as deﬁned as (1—
rights issue price of security/ex-rights date price of security). There are 10 rights-issuing ﬁrms from our sample in Table 3 for which prior
promoter ownership data are not available. The numbers in parenthesis in the "No. of companies" column represent total number of
rights issues in that year.
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categories are represented, covering manufacturing, services and agro-based industries.
The summary statistics of the rights-issuing ﬁrms are presented in Table 3. The average amount of capital
raised from the rights issues varied from Rs. 275 million in 2002 to Rs. 3.1 billion in 2008, while the median
amount of capital raised varied from Rs. 148 million in 2002 to Rs. 556 million in 2008. Table 3 also shows
that the median discount for the rights issues ranged from 6 to 43% of the ex-rights date share price, which
seems rather large compared to seasoned equity offerings in other countries (see Section 2.1 for details).
However, in a few cases, the shareswere sold at a premium. Themedian ratio of shares offered to shareholders
per units of shares held varied between 0.42 (approximately two for every ﬁve shares held) to 0.67 (approx-
imately two shares for every three shares held). Finally, Table 3 shows that the average (mean) ownership
stake of the promoters one year prior to the rights issue was quite high — it ranged between 48 and 49% for
the period 2002 through 2008.
Table 4 provides information on the ownership structures of ﬁrms offering rights issues from 2002
through 2008. For the purposes of our analysis, we divide the rights-issuingﬁrms into four ownership groups:
ﬁrms belonging to Indian business groups; listed Indian companies that do not belong to a business group
(stand-aloneﬁrms); foreign companies (ﬁrmspromoted by non-Indian businesses); and government compa-
nies (listed ﬁrms in which the Indian Government is the majority shareholder). More than half of the rights-
issuing ﬁrms (67 of the 127 ﬁrms) belong to an Indian business group, and 46 of the rights-issuing ﬁrmswereTable 4
Afﬁliation of rights-issuing companies by year.
Year Indian business group
companies
Stand-alone Indian
companies
Foreign companies Government-owned
companies
2002 5 0 1 0
2003 3 0 1 0
2004 8 3 4 1
2005 11 6 1 0
2006 15 15 2 0
2007 13 16 1 1
2008 12 6 2 0
Total 67 46 12 2
Source: Prowess database.
Table 5
Promoter ownership of rights-issuing companies by year.
Year Indian business group companies Stand-alone Indian companies Foreign companies Government-owned companies
Mean (%) Median (%) Number
of ﬁrms
Mean (%) Median (%) Number
of ﬁrms
Mean (%) Median (%) Number
of ﬁrms
Mean (%) Median (%) Number
of ﬁrms
Year
before
Change post
rights issue
year
Year
before
Change post
rights issue
year
Year
before
Change post
rights issue
year
Year
before
Change post
rights issue
year
Year
before
Change post
rights issue
year
Year
before
Change post
rights issue
year
Year
before
Change post
rights issue
year
Year
before
Change post
rights issue
year
2002 50.41 2.72 50.80 0.10 5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 51.91 −0.57 51.91 −0.57 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0
2003 49.95 0.44 43.97 −1.36 3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 68.81 −5.99 68.81 −5.99 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0
2004 51.53 5.92 58.86 3.30 8 19.46 −3.56 19.46 −3.56 2 73.99 −1.05 77.80 −4.34 4 35.73 0.99 35.73 0.99 1
2005 45.49 −0.97 42.83 −0.12 10 39.56 −2.24 40.03 −1.50 6 83.21 0.00 83.21 0.00 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0
2006 45.47 1.12 46.91 0.55 14 37.04 0.51 36.49 0.00 14 65.57 0.00 65.57 0.00 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0
2007 51.50 3.01 52.34 0.00 13 50.56 0.12 52.39 0.00 16 80.48 −10.91 80.48 −10.91 1 39.66 4.44 39.66 4.44 1
2008 40.83 1.50 34.24 0.30 8 43.35 0.65 43.17 0.07 4 61.57 11.80 61.57 11.80 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0
Total 61 42 12 2
Source: Prowess database.
Notes:
There are 10 rights-issuing ﬁrms from our sample in Tables 3 and 4 for which prior promoter ownership data are not available. None of the differences presented here are statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels.
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81G. Jetley, S.S. Mondal / Emerging Markets Review 23 (2015) 68–95stand-alone ﬁrms. The table also shows that only a few foreign ﬁrms and government ﬁrms issued equity on a
rights basis from 2002 through 2008.
Table 5 shows promoter ownership of the rights-issuing ﬁrms before and after the rights issues by different
ownership categories. As noted in footnote 1 to Table 5, there are 10 ﬁrms in the original 127 ﬁrms in Table 4 for
which prior year ownership data are not available, and thus, the total sample size becomes 117 for Table 5. Since
ownership data are available only on an annual basis in the Prowess database, the table compares promoters'
stakes in the year prior to the rights issues to their stakes in the year of the rights issue. The table shows that pro-
moter ownership levels were generally high for ﬁrms belonging to an Indian business group or foreign ﬁrms. By
comparison, promoter shareholding in stand-alone ﬁrms prior to rights issue is lower.7 Table 5 also provides
some insight into the pattern of changes in promoter ownership following rights issues by ﬁrms belonging to
different ownership groups. In particular, the recorded changes in shareholding subsequent to a rights issue
were higher for Indian business group companies than other groups in almost all years.
A comparison of the change in promoter ownership following a rights issue within a ﬁrm type but across
years shows that in later years the increase in promoter ownership declined. In particular, increase in promot-
er ownership following a rights issue is much smaller during Regime 4, which starts in the second quarter of
2005. As discussed in detail later, the lower increase in ownership may have been triggered by a change in
capital gain tax rates starting from October 2004. In particular, long-term capital gains tax was reduced
from 20% to under 0.2%, which makes it easier for a minority shareholder to realize the offering discount by
selling shares in the secondary market and then buying them back via the rights issue. Alternatively, a share-
holder could sell or relinquish all or part of the rights issues that are allotted to him. However, we did not ﬁnd
any evidence of a market that facilitated such transactions.
In order to establish a link between changes in ownership and rights issues, one needs to control for other
possible explanations of the observed increase in the promoters' stakes in ﬁrms issuing equity on a rights
basis. In the next section, we benchmark the changes in promoters' shares of ﬁrms issuing rights equity to
those of comparable ﬁrms that did not issue equity on a rights basis. We also run tests that provide insight
into the intent of the rights issue, to try to determine if promoters do actually issue equity with an objective
to increase their stake.4.2. Regression models, tests of hypotheses and results
To establish a benchmark for changes in promoters' stakes, we select a set of control ﬁrms. First we limit
our analysis to domestic private ﬁrms, i.e., we exclude government and foreign ﬁrms. Government ﬁrms
are excluded because it is unlikely that government-owned ﬁrms will use rights issues in order to increase
their stake. Foreign ﬁrms are excluded because incentives of promoters of foreign ﬁrms are likely to be differ-
ent from those of promoters of Indian non-government-owned ﬁrms. This is because, in general, regulations
during 2002 to 2008 did not allow foreign ﬁrms to operate in India through wholly owned subsidiaries. Next,
for each non-government and non-foreign-owned ﬁrmwith a rights issue from 2002 through 2008, we iden-
tify comparable ﬁrms by ﬁrst identifying all ﬁrms in the Prowess database in the same industry8 and owner-
ship category (i.e., Indian business group or stand-alone). Then, among ﬁrms in the same industry and
ownership category, we isolate ﬁrmswith similar revenues— ﬁrmswith revenueswithin 40% of the revenues
of the rights-issuing companies in at least two of the years 2001–2008. The purpose of this is to ensure that the
ﬁrms have similar ownership category, have the same industry afﬁliation and are somewhat similar in their
earnings. We keep at most 5 comparables for each rights-issuing ﬁrm.
Table 6 compares the rights-issuing ﬁrms and their comparables along several dimensions. Based on our
methodology, we could identify comparable ﬁrms for 78 of the rights-issuing ﬁrms. The table shows that,
on average, rights-issuing ﬁrms were larger in terms of overall assets and had lower debt-to-equity ratios7 Note that in certain instances the promoter shareholding exceeds 75%. This is because prior to August 2010, in certain exceptional cir-
cumstances, regulations allowpromoter ownership of up to 90%. In particular, Rule 19(2)(b) of the Securities Contract (Regulation) Rules,
1957, allowed public shareholding to drop below25% if certain conditionsweremet, such as: a ﬁrmhad at least 2million securities issued
to investors, and themarket capitalization of the ﬁrmwas at least Rs. 1 billion. So it is not unusual to see a few companieswithmore than
75% of promoter shareholding at certain points during our sample period (http://www.sebi.gov.in/annualreport/0607/Part1.pdf).
8 Prowess assigns each company to one of many industries. The 4465 public companies that formed our initial sample between 1998
and 2008 were categorized into 126 industries.
Table 6
Characteristics of rights-issuing ﬁrms and their comparables.
Average assets
(Rs. million)
Average debt–equity ratio Average promoter shareholding prior
to rights issue
Number of ﬁrms
Non-rights-issuing ﬁrms 3097 1.70 49.88 308
Rights-issuing ﬁrms 4612 1.79 47.41 78
Total 386
Source: Prowess database.
Notes:
The method of choosing comparable ﬁrms is as deﬁned in the text. Assets and debt–equity ratio are as deﬁned in the Prowess database.
Government-owned, foreign-owned and ﬁnancial ﬁrms are not included in Table 6. For some rights-issuing ﬁrms, comparable ﬁrms
could not be found. These are not included in any subsequent regression analysis.
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slightly smaller than in the comparable ﬁrms.
4.2.1. Increase in promoters' shareholding following a rights issue
Recall that Hypothesis 1A seeks to compare the change in promoter shareholding between rights-issuing
ﬁrms and comparable ﬁrms. To examine the extent to which the change in promoter share in a ﬁrm is related
to a rights issue, we use the following regression model.9 A ri
verage s
weakneΔ Ps changetð Þ ¼
α1 þ β1 ln assetst−1ð Þ þ β2 ln
Debt
Equity
 
t−1
þ β3 Indicator f orRights Issueð Þ
þ β4 MoneyRaisedthroughIPOð Þ þ β5 Indicator f or Year above2004ð Þ
þ β6 ReturnonEquityð Þt−1 þ β7 Indicator f or IndianBusinessGroupFirmð Þ
þ β8 InteractionbetweenBusinessGroupandRights Issueð Þ
þ f 1 IndustryIndicatorð Þ þ ϑt
ð1ÞΔ(Ps _ changet) is the change in promoters ownership. For ﬁrms issuing equity on a rights basis,
Δ(Ps _ changet) is the difference in the promoter's stake in theﬁrmas of the endof the year inwhich the rights
issue was completed from that of the prior year. For comparable ﬁrms used as a benchmark for a particular
ﬁrmwith a rights issue,Δ(Ps _ changet) is the change in the promoter's stake during the period used to com-
pute the promoter ownership change for the rights-issuing ﬁrm. The average change in the promoter stake
subsequent to the rights issue is denoted by the constant term α1. The model includes an indicator variable
for rights-issuing ﬁrms (Indicator for Rights Issue) and an indicator for business group ﬁrms (Indicator for
Indian Business Group Firm). The Indicator for Rights Issue will isolate the impact of the change in promoter
stake related to the rights issue, whereas the Indicator for Indian Business Group Firm isolates increase in pro-
moter ownership for a business group ﬁrmwithin a year. Our test for Hypotheses 1A and 1B comprises exam-
ining the value of coefﬁcients corresponding to these variables. In particular, we expect both β3 and β8 to be
positive. The interaction between the rights-issuing ﬁrms and the ﬁrms belonging to Indian business groups
(coefﬁcient β8) is expected to isolate the extent to which the change in promoter ownership of rights-issuing
ﬁrms that belong to an Indian business group differs from that for other types of ﬁrms that issue rights equity.
In the model, we control for a few ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics — size and leverage. Ln(assetst − 1) for the
rights-issuing ﬁrms and the corresponding benchmark ﬁrms is the natural logarithm of assets as of the year-
end prior to the year inwhich the rights issuewas completed.We expect the change in ownership to be lower
for larger ﬁrms. Ln(Debt/Equity)t− 1 for the rights-issuingﬁrms and the corresponding benchmarkﬁrms is the
natural logarithm of the debt-to-equity ratio (deﬁned as the ratio of total borrowings to net worth in Prowess)
as of the year-end prior to the year in which the rights issue was completed. There are two possible and op-
posing effects of a high level of debt in a company. Firms with higher leverage may be perceived to be more
risky, and, all else being equal, purchase of shares by minority shareholders of riskier ﬁrmsmight be lower in
general.9 On the other hand, debtmaybehelpful in reducing agency costs of free cashﬂow (Jensen, 1986), andghts issue is likely to lower leverage, and thus leverage prior to the rights issue may not be the best benchmark for expected le-
ubsequent to the rights issue. However, our view is that high pre-rights-issue leverage is likely an indicator of some inherent
ss in the company's prospects, which may discourage minority shareholders from subscribing to the rights issue.
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additional capital, on balance, we expect the change in ownership to be larger for ﬁrms with higher leverage.
To control for market-wide appetite for equity, issued on a rights basis or otherwise, we include the amount
ofmoney, in billions of rupees, raised via an IPO in the year inwhich the rights issuewas done. Using the amount
of funds raised in IPOs is consistentwith themethod used by Bayless and Chaplinski (1996) to identify periods of
hot and coldmarkets. As we discuss below, the capital gains tax was reduced in years subsequent to 2004. A re-
duction in capital gains tax, coupled with the fact that rights issues are priced at a discount to the market, sug-
gests that subsequent to 2004 investors would have a greater ﬁnancial incentive to participate in a rights
issue in order to realize the issuance discount. To control for the change in the tax regime we use an indicator
for post-2004 tax regime. To control formeasures of ﬁrm performance, we introduce the lagged values of Return
on Equity for the companies in question.10 We also include indicator variables for various industry categories.
Speciﬁcally, we reclassiﬁed the industry categorization from Prowess into four broad categories: Manufacturing,
Agricultural, Other Financial Services and Services.
We run three speciﬁcations. The ﬁrst speciﬁcation is the model with the ﬁrm characteristics variables, in-
cluding a control for ﬁrm performance, the general market condition and tax regime variables and the Rights
Issue Indicator variable. InModel 2,we introduce the indicator for business group ﬁrms and the interaction be-
tween the indicator for ﬁrms belonging to a business group and the Rights Issue Indicator. In Model 3, we add
industry indicator variables to Model 2.
The results are reported in Table 7. The table shows that the lagged value of assets has a negative impact on
the change in promoters' ownership, and is statistically signiﬁcant for speciﬁcations 2 and 3. Also, leveraged
ﬁrms experience increase in promoters' share, but the effect is not statistically signiﬁcant for any speciﬁca-
tions. Ignoring controls for business group and industry, the Indicator for Rights Issue variable is positive and
statistically signiﬁcant. General market conditions, as captured by the amount of money raised through
IPOs in a given year, and lagged return on equity have no meaningful impact on increase in promoter share-
holding. For instance, an increase in overall IPO raised in a year of Rs. 10 billion will result in an increase in
promoter shareholding of 0.5%. The change in tax regime has resulted in promoter shareholding being
lower in general for all ﬁrms, but this is not signiﬁcant for any speciﬁcations. The table shows that ﬁrms
with a rights issue, on average, had an increase of about 2.8 percentage points in the promoters' stake com-
pared to benchmark ﬁrms without a rights issue, controlling for the various ﬁrm characteristics. The table
also shows that even after controls are included for business groups, in Models 2 and 3, the coefﬁcient for
the Indicator for Rights Issue variable remains stable but is not statistically signiﬁcant.
Models 2 and 3 show that business group ﬁrms, regardless of whether they have a rights issue or not, increase
promoter shareholding by close to 2%. Further, the interaction between rights-issuingﬁrms andﬁrmsbelonging to
a business group is positive but not statistically signiﬁcant. However, the cumulative impact of rights issuing on
promoter shareholding for a business group ﬁrm in the rights issue year is obtained by adding the coefﬁcients
of: a) the indicator variable for business group afﬁliation; b) the indicator variable for rights issues; and c) the
interaction between the indicators for business group afﬁliation and rights issues. Calculated this way, we ﬁnd
thatpromoters' ownership inbusiness groupﬁrmswitha rights issue increasedby6.14 and6.24percentagepoints
in Models 2 and 3, respectively. Thus, the results demonstrate that rights issues help promoters of ﬁrms increase
their ownership stake andpromoters ofﬁrmsbelonging to abusiness group realize aneven larger increase inown-
ership stake subsequent to a rights issue. Our results are therefore consistentwith the conclusion that rights issues
help promoters circumvent the creeping acquisition provisions of the Takeover Code, as claimed inHypotheses 1A
and 1B. Controlling for differences in broad industry categories makes no difference to this conclusion.4.2.2. Investigating intent
In order to examine the extent to which a rights issue wasmotivated by the promoter's desire to increase
shareholding, we ﬁrst reviewed the prospectus for each of the 78 rights-issuing ﬁrms in the ﬁnal sample.
Rights issues were distributed into two buckets— issues with speciﬁc objectives and issues with vague objec-
tives. Table 2 lists a few of the 78 rights issues, and how each of the issues was categorized.11 As stated above,
rights issues in whichmore than 50% of the proceeds were proposed to be spent on speciﬁc projects were put10 We also use Return on Assets as an alternativemeasure of performance, and the results remain unchanged. Results are available on request.
11 The full list of documentation of all 78 ﬁrms is available upon request.
Table 7
Regression results of change in promoter share subsequent to rights issue.
Dependent variable: Change in promoter share
Independent variables: Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Constant 1.295 2.453* 3.291*
[1.309] [1.433] [1.924]
Log of Lagged value of Assets −0.153 −0.686* −0.726**
[0.239] [0.351] [0.337]
Log of Lagged Value of Debt–Equity Ratio 0.401 0.397 0.375
[0.514] [0.488] [0.596]
Indicator for Rights Issue Firm 2.823** 1.187 1.192
[1.418] [2.539] [2.559]
Total Money Raised in IPOs in the Year (Rs. Billions) 0.00559 0.00546 0.00539
[0.00688] [0.00676] [0.00719]
Indicator for Year N 2004 −2.835 −2.334 −2.276
[1.921] [1.806] [1.887]
Lagged Value of Return on Equity 0.00454 0.00314 0.00290
[0.0126] [0.0120] [0.0124]
Indicator for an Indian Business Group Firm 1.957 2.059
[1.246] [1.305]
Interaction for Rights Issue and Business Group Firm 2.998 2.991
[2.691] [2.671]
Indicator for Agriculture Industry −1.891
[3.003]
Indicator for Manufacturing Industry −0.776
[1.680]
Indicator for Services Industry −0.704
[2.707]
Number of observations 386 386 386
Adjusted R-squared 0.013 0.024 0.017
Coefﬁcient for Business Group Indicator + Rights Issue Indicator + Interaction of Business Groups and Rights Issue:
6.14*** 6.24***
[1.68] [1.77]
Notes: The sample covers the period starting in 2002 and ending in 2008, and contains Business Groups and Stand-alone ﬁrms listed on
the Bombay Stock Exchange. For each rights-issuing ﬁrm, comparable ﬁrms that meet the following criteria are selected: 1) the ﬁrm
should not have issued equity on a rights basis between 2002 and 2008; 2) the ﬁrm should be listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange
and be in the same industry as deﬁned by Prowess; 3) the ﬁrm should have sales that are within 40% of the revenues of the rights-
issuing companies in at least two of the years 2001–2008; and 4) the ﬁrm should be of the same type (i.e., Stand-alone or Business
Group) as the rights-issuing ﬁrm. We report heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors for our regressions, which are contained in
the parentheses. The omitted industry category is Other Financial Services. Levels of signiﬁcance are indicated by asterisks: * represents
signiﬁcance of coefﬁcient at the 10% level, ** represents signiﬁcance at the 5% level, and *** represents signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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of the 78 rights issues as having non-speciﬁc objectives, and the other 42 as issues with speciﬁc objectives.
Next, we examine the evolution of promoters' shareholding in the years leading to the rights issue. Table 8
shows the change in equity ownership of promoters of rights-issuing ﬁrms and comparable ﬁrms during a
three-year period prior to the rights issue. Rights-issuing ﬁrms are also broken down by objective — non-
speciﬁc or speciﬁc. The table shows that one year prior to a rights issue, the ownership of promoters of all
rights-issuing ﬁrms falls by about 2 percentage points, while equity ownership of promoters of comparable
ﬁrms falls by about 0.9 percentage points. As shown in Table 8, promoters of rights-issuing ﬁrms with non-
speciﬁc objectives have a decline of about 3.3 percentage points, which is over three times greater than the
average decline of comparable non-rights-issuing ﬁrms. This difference is signiﬁcant from both a statistical
(a p-value of 0.03) and an economic perspective. Table 8 also shows that change in promoters' holdings dur-
ing the three-year period for rights-issuing ﬁrms with speciﬁc objectives is not signiﬁcantly different from
that of comparable ﬁrms.
Table 8 also allows a comparison based on the type of ﬁrms — stand-alone versus those belonging to a
business group. The table shows that ﬁrms belonging to a business group seem to have a greater tendency
for rights issues with vague objective. For example, 45 of the 78 rights-issuing ﬁrms belong to a business
Table 8
Change in promoter shareholding prior to rights issues: rights-issuing ﬁrms vs. comparative ﬁrms.
Year prior to
rights issue
Rights issue
identiﬁer
Objective Overall Business group ﬁrms Stand-alone ﬁrms
Change in
promoter
shareholding
(%)
Sample
size
Change in
promoter
shareholding
(%)
Sample
size
Change in
promoter
shareholding
(%)
Sample
size
3 No 0.21 181 −0.14 94 0.58 87
Yes Non-speciﬁc −0.14 29 0.48 17 −1.02 12
Speciﬁc 1.12 40 1.34 19 0.92 21
Overall 0.59 69 0.93 36 0.21 33
2 No −0.22 198 −0.05 106 −0.41 92
Yes Non-speciﬁc −1.55 31 −0.41 20 −3.63 12
Speciﬁc −0.23 41 −0.53 19 0.048 21
Overall −0.80 72 −0.47 39 −1.22 33
1 No −0.92 234 −0.43 127 −1.49 107
Yes Non-speciﬁc −3.30 35 −1.96 23 −5.88 12
Speciﬁc −0.90 41 −0.75 20 −1.06 21
Overall −2.01 76 −1.39 43 −2.87 33
0 No −0.78 308 −0.22 172 −1.44 136
Yes Non-speciﬁc 3.09 36 4.51 24 0.12 12
Speciﬁc 3.12 42 3.41 21 2.83 21
Overall 3.11 78 3.98 45 1.86 33
Notes: The sample covers the period starting in 2002 and ending in 2008, and contains Business Groups and Stand-alone ﬁrms listed on
the Bombay Stock Exchange. For each rights-issuing ﬁrm, comparable ﬁrms that meet the following criteria are selected: 1) the ﬁrm
should not have issued equity on a rights basis between 2002 and 2008; 2) the ﬁrm should be listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange
and be in the same industry as deﬁned by Prowess; 3) the ﬁrm should have sales that are within 40% of the revenues of the rights-
issuing companies in at least two of the years 2001–2008; and 4) the ﬁrm should be of the same type (i.e., Stand-alone or Business
Group) as the rights-issuing ﬁrm. Further, we break rights-issuing ﬁrms into groups based on their stated objectives. We assess the ob-
jectives of the rights issue as follows: if the company clearly speciﬁes the details of the project or objective for which it is raising
money, and the share of that expense is more than 50% of the total planned expenditure, then we classify the objective as speciﬁc. If
the reason for the rights issue is stated to be to improveworking capital requirements or retire debt (or if it is unspeciﬁed), then the rights
issues are classiﬁed as non-speciﬁc. Because this is not a balanced panel of ﬁrms, and because the promoter shareholding of ﬁrmswas not
reported prior to 2001, the number of ﬁrms and their comparables vary across the years.
85G. Jetley, S.S. Mondal / Emerging Markets Review 23 (2015) 68–95group, and 24 of these 45 rights issues (53%) had non-speciﬁc objectives. On the other hand, 12 (35%) of the
33 rights issues by stand-alone ﬁrms had non-speciﬁc objectives. While the difference is large, a proportions
test shows that the difference is not statistically signiﬁcant, with a p-value of 0.14.
The information presented in Table 8 suggests that loss of promoters' holdings may help predict a rights
issue, especially a rights issue with non-speciﬁc objectives. Hypothesis 2A predicts that the rights-issuing
decision is positively related to prior loss in promoter shareholding. To test if loss of promoter holdings can
help predict a rights issue, we ran the following logistic regression model:yi ¼ αþ β1  measuresof prior lossof promotershareholdingð Þ þ β2 ln assetsit−1ð Þ
þ β3 ln leverageit−1ð Þ þ β4 ReturnonEquityð Þt−1 þ f IndustryIndicatorsð Þ þ εi
ð2Þwhere yi is a ﬁrm-speciﬁc indicator variable that identiﬁes a rights-issuing company. For measures of prior
loss of promoter shareholding, we consider two measures. The ﬁrst measure is an indicator for loss of at
least 3% of promoter shareholding over the 3 years leading up to a rights issue. The choice of 3% as the thresh-
old of loss of shareholding is admittedly arbitrary, and is intended to capture relatively large losses in promot-
er shareholding over a period of time. Our results are robust to other choices for this threshold, such as 4% or
5%. We also consider another measure: the total change in promoter shareholding for the year prior to rights
issue. According to Hypothesis 2A, the coefﬁcient β1 is expected to be positive and signiﬁcant. We introduce
controls for size (assets), the debt–equity ratio (leverage) and return on equity (performance). Finally, we in-
clude indicators for different broad industry categories.
Table 9A
Logistic regression results for prediction of rights issues by ﬁrms.
Dependent variable: Indicator for rights issue by a ﬁrm
Model 1 Model 2
Independent variables Overall Marginal
effect
Non-speciﬁc Marginal
effect
Speciﬁc Marginal
effect
Overall Marginal
effect
Non-speciﬁc Marginal
effect
Speciﬁc Marginal
effect
Constant −1.797*** −3.033*** −0.674 −1.643*** −3.104*** −0.622
[0.565] [0.893] [0.786] [0.558] [0.897] [0.790]
Indicator for share loss of more than
3% in the 3-year period leading
up to rights issue
0.789*** 0.137** 1.357*** 0.215** 0.251 0.0438
[0.301] (0.0585) [0.463] (0.0916) [0.428] (0.0773)
First lag of change in promoter
shareholding
−0.0101 −0.00153 −0.0869*** −0.00973*** 0.0302 0.00502
[0.0204] (0.00310) [0.0314] (0.00350) [0.0241] (0.00398)
First lag of log of assets 0.121 0.0182 0.340** 0.0391** −0.0191 −0.00321 0.138 0.0209 0.455*** 0.0510*** −0.0131 −0.00217
[0.0896] (0.0134) [0.154] (0.0171) [0.114] (0.0192) [0.0893] (0.0135) [0.163] (0.0171) [0.114] (0.0190)
First lag of log of debt–equity ratio 0.257** 0.0386** 0.461** 0.0531** 0.0528 0.00884 0.265** 0.0403** 0.516** 0.0578*** 0.117 0.0195
[0.126] (0.0186) [0.203] (0.0222) [0.168] (0.0282) [0.127] (0.0190) [0.206] (0.0216) [0.175] (0.0290)
Lagged value of return on equity 0.0151*** 0.00227*** 0.0103 0.00119 0.0275*** 0.00461*** 0.0155*** 0.00236*** 0.0102 0.00114 0.0288*** 0.00479***
[0.00574] (0.000834) [0.00806] (0.000919) [0.0107] (0.00162) [0.00575] (0.000847) [0.00790] (0.000879) [0.0109] (0.00164)
Indicator for agriculture industry −0.548 −0.0701 −0.887 −0.0782 −0.762 −0.102 −0.551 −0.0716 −1.270 −0.0974** −0.504 −0.0724
[0.655] (0.0701) [0.911] (0.0591) [1.294] (0.133) [0.645] (0.0700) [0.890] (0.0442) [1.292] (0.157)
Indicator for services industry −0.531 −0.0873 −0.732 −0.0952 −0.810 −0.158 −0.618 −0.104 −1.161* −0.158 −0.841 −0.164
[0.413] (0.0736) [0.663] (0.0957) [0.585] (0.127) [0.408] (0.0753) [0.633] (0.0996) [0.589] (0.128)
Number of observations 386 214 172 386 214 172
Pseudo R-squared 0.0593 0.129 0.0591 0.0430 0.128 0.0654
Notes: The sample covers the period starting in 2002 and ending in 2008, and contains Business Groups and Stand-alone ﬁrms listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange. For each rights-issuing ﬁrm,
comparable ﬁrms that meet the following criteria are selected: 1) the ﬁrm should not have issued equity on a rights basis between 2002 and 2008; 2) the ﬁrm should be listed on the Bombay Stock
Exchange and be in the same industry as deﬁned by Prowess; 3) the ﬁrm should have sales that are within 40% of the revenues of the rights-issuing companies in at least two of the years 2001–2008;
and 4) the ﬁrm should be of the same type (i.e., Stand-alone or Business Group) as the rights-issuing ﬁrm. The two models are differentiated as follows: In Model 1, there is an indicator for ﬁrms that
lost at least 3% of promoter shareholding over the 3 years prior to rights issue, while in Model 2, we use the continuous variable that tracks loss of promoter shareholding in the year prior to rights
issue. The non-speciﬁc ﬁrms are oneswhose objectives for rights issues are not clearly speciﬁed in their Letters of Offer, or are speciﬁed for purposes of augmentingworking capital and retiring debt. Stan-
dard errors for our logistic regressions are contained in the parenthesis. The omitted industry category is Other Financial Services and manufacturing combined, as one of these industries predict failure
perfectly in a logistic regression. In addition to the coefﬁcient estimates, we also report the marginal impact of the estimates, and the resulting standard errors. Levels of signiﬁcance are indicated by
asterisks: * represents signiﬁcance of coefﬁcient at the 10% level, ** represents signiﬁcance at the 5% level, and *** represents signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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87G. Jetley, S.S. Mondal / Emerging Markets Review 23 (2015) 68–95The results are presented in Table 9A, and report coefﬁcients as well as marginal effects. We run the
models for all rights-issuing ﬁrms and their comparables, and also separately for rights-issuing ﬁrms with
project-speciﬁc reasons and non-project-speciﬁc reasons. The results show that the indicator for loss
of promoter shareholding of more than 3% over the 3 years leading up to the rights issue is positively
correlated with the rights-issuing decision, which is consistent with Hypothesis 2A — prior loss in
promoter shareholding is strongly associated with the rights-issuing decision. Furthermore, bifurcat-
ing the rights-issuing ﬁrms by objectives shows that this result is driven by the ﬁrms with non-
speciﬁc objectives. While the coefﬁcient for the ﬁrms with speciﬁc objectives is positive, its magnitude
is much smaller compared to rights issues with non-speciﬁc objectives, and it is not statistically sig-
niﬁcant either The results of the second model, using the ﬁrst lag of change in promoter shareholding,
are consistent with those of Model 1. Firms that had a decrease (increase) in promoter shareholding
had a higher (lower) propensity for a rights issue, and this effect is strong for ﬁrms with rights issues
with non-speciﬁc objectives. The results indicate that larger ﬁrms (with higher lagged return on as-
sets) are more likely to go for a rights issue, and leverage is also positively associated with the
rights-issuing decision.
In addition, as posited byHypothesis 3, the results presented in Table 9Ademonstrate that the likelihood of
a rights issue with non-speciﬁc objectives is much higher for ﬁrms with a high level of loss in promoter own-
ership (“Model 1 Non-Speciﬁc” and “Model 2 Non-Speciﬁc”), whereas the likelihood of a rights issue with a
speciﬁc objective is unrelated to prior loss in ownership (“Model 1 Speciﬁc” and “Model 2 Speciﬁc”). This is
consistent with Hypothesis 3 — promoters seeking to increase their stake via a rights issue are likely to do
so with the help of a rights issue that has non-speciﬁc objectives.
Next, we incorporate cause of the decline in promoter ownership in our analysis to gain better insight
regarding intent. As discussed above, we categorize the observed percentage declines in promoter owner-
ship as absolute and relative, where absolute declines correspond to sale of shares by the promoter and
relative declines are associated with issuance of shares to other shareholders through private placements
or partnership in a joint venture (or both). In particular, we modify Model 1 in Table 9A by replacing in-
dicator for loss of promoter shareholding of more than 3% over the 3 years leading up to the rights issue
with two indicator variables. One of the two new indicator variables takes the value of 1 when there is a
3% or more absolute loss in promoter ownership, while the other variable captures instances where the
decline in promoter ownership of more than 3% is due to capital expansion (i.e., instances of a relative de-
cline). In instances in which a promoter's ownership has fallen by more than 3 percentage points because
of both selling and capital expansion, we categorize the loss as absolute or relative based on the type of
decline that contributes more to the observed decline. Thus, if 2.5 percentage points of a 3.5-percent-
age-point decline can be attributed to selling of shares, then the observed loss is treated as an absolute
loss. Our baseline group consists of companies that did not have a decline in promoter shareholding of
3% or more.
Table 9B shows that both relative loss and absolute loss are positively correlatedwith the propensity to do
a rights issue. However, only the coefﬁcient for absolute loss (i.e., sales of shares) is statistically signiﬁcant.
This result is consistentwith Hypothesis 2B, and it provides amore nuanced understanding of why promoters
may seek to use rights issues as a mechanism for increasing their shareholding. While the results in Table 9A
suggest that promoterswho realize a 3-percentage-point reduction in ownership stakemay be incentivized to
do a rights issue, Table 9B suggests that promoters who lose ownership due to previous sale of shares are the
ones with a stronger incentive.4.2.3. Examining stake increase of 5 percentage points or more
Next, we examine incentives of promoters who may be seeking to increase their ownership stake by
over 5% in a year. We test for speciﬁc ownership thresholds — 50% and 25%. Implicit in our approach is
the assumption that promoters seek to increase ownership in order to increase control over their ﬁrms.
Thus, we expect the incentives to use rights issues to increase promoter ownership by over 5 percentage
points to be higher when the ownership is below the 25% and 50% threshold. Rights issues are particularly
appealing for increasing stake because, ﬁrst, promoters can acquire shares at a discount to the prevailing
market price (see Fig. 1); and second, increases in ownership caused by participation in a rights issue do
not trigger the need for disclosure or an open offer under the Takeover Code.
Table 9B
Logistic regression results for prediction of rights issues by ﬁrms.
Dependent variable: Indicator for rights-issue by a ﬁrm
Independent variables Overall Marginal
effect
Non-speciﬁc Marginal
effect
Speciﬁc Marginal
effect
Constant −1.831*** −3.288*** −0.620
[0.569] [0.916] [0.789]
Indicator for share loss of more than 3% in
the 3-year period leading up to rights
issue due to capital expansion
0.540 0.0933 0.203 0.0246 0.820 0.165
[0.539] (0.105) [0.884] (0.114) [0.762] (0.176)
Indicator for share loss of more than 3% in
the 3-year period leading up to rights
issue due to selling
0.882*** 0.159** 1.809*** 0.321*** 0.0541 0.00918
[0.340] (0.0703) [0.530] (0.120) [0.493] (0.0846)
First lag of log of assets 0.882*** 0.159** 1.809*** 0.321*** 0.0541 0.00918
[0.340] (0.0703) [0.530] (0.120) [0.493] (0.0846)
First lag of log of debt–equity ratio 0.132 0.0198 0.403** 0.0457*** −0.0355 −0.00596
[0.0916] (0.0136) [0.160] (0.0172) [0.116] (0.0195)
Lagged value of return on equity 0.253** 0.0378** 0.413** 0.0469** 0.0436 0.00732
[0.127] (0.0187) [0.207] (0.0224) [0.169] (0.0284)
Indicator for agriculture industry 0.0151*** 0.00226*** 0.00913 0.00104 0.0264** 0.00444***
[0.00577] (0.000837) [0.00830] (0.000934) [0.0105] (0.00161)
Indicator for services industry −0.608 −0.0763 −1.118 −0.0908* −0.616 −0.0865
[0.665] (0.0682) [0.947] (0.0522) [1.302] (0.149)
Number of observations 386 214 172
Pseudo R-squared 0.0601 0.144 0.0633
Notes: The sample covers the period starting in 2002 and ending in 2008, and contains Business Groups and Stand-alone ﬁrms listed on
the Bombay Stock Exchange. For each rights-issuing ﬁrm, comparable ﬁrms that meet the following criteria are selected: 1) the ﬁrm
should not have issued equity on a rights basis between 2002 and 2008; 2) the ﬁrm should be listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange
and be in the same industry as deﬁned by Prowess; 3) the ﬁrm should have sales that are within 40% of the revenues of the rights-
issuing companies in at least two of the years 2001–2008; and 4) the ﬁrm should be of the same type (i.e., Stand-alone or Business
Group) as the rights-issuing ﬁrm. In the Model, there are indicators for ﬁrms that lost at least 3% of promoter shareholding over the
3 years prior to rights issue due to expansion in capital base (relative) or due to sale of shares (absolute). The non-speciﬁc ﬁrms are
oneswhose objectives for rights issues are not clearly speciﬁed in their Letters of Offer, or are speciﬁed for purposes of augmentingwork-
ing capital and retiring debt. Standard errors for our logistic regressions are contained in the parenthesis. The omitted industry category is
Other Financial Services and manufacturing combined, as one of these industries predict failure perfectly in a logistic regression. In addi-
tion to the coefﬁcient estimates, we also report the marginal impact of the estimates, and the resulting standard errors. Levels of signif-
icance are indicated by asterisks: * represents signiﬁcance of coefﬁcient at the 10% level, ** represents signiﬁcance at the 5% level, and
*** represents signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
88 G. Jetley, S.S. Mondal / Emerging Markets Review 23 (2015) 68–95We run the following logistic model to examine factors that may explain a relatively large increase in
promoter ownership following a rights issue. A relatively large change in holdings is deﬁned as change of 5
percentage points or more. The 5-percentage-point threshold is based on the limit on creeping acquisitions
mandated by the Takeover Code.y ¼ f
α2 þ γ1 ln assetst−1ð Þ þ γ2 ln
Debt
Equity
 
t−1
þ γ3discount
þ γ4 Indicator f or Year N 2004ð Þ þ γ5ReturnonEquityt−1
þ γ6 Indicator f orBusinessGroupFirmsð Þ
þ γ7 Indicator f or Prior Promoter Shareholdingbetween15and25ð Þ
þ γ8 Indicator f or Prior Promoter Shareholdingbetween25and45ð Þ
þ γ9 Indicator f or SpecificRights IssueObjectiveð Þ
þ f IndustryIndicatorsð Þ þ ϑ2
0
BBBBBBBBBB@
1
CCCCCCCCCCA
wherey ¼ 1if PromoterShareChangeismorethan5%
¼ 0; otherwise;
ð3Þand f(.) is the logistic function transformation.
89G. Jetley, S.S. Mondal / Emerging Markets Review 23 (2015) 68–95The dependent variable y is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the promoter's ownership increases
by more than 5 percentage points immediately following a rights issue. Immediate change in ownership is
equal to the difference between the promoter's ownership as of the year-end following the rights issue and
year-end ownership in the prior year. We also include the natural logarithm of assets as of the year-end
prior to the year in which the rights issue was completed, with coefﬁcient γ1. We expect the likelihood of
an increase in promoter shareholding of 5 percentage points or more to be smaller for larger ﬁrms. We also
include the natural logarithm of the debt-to-equity ratio, or leverage, as of the year-end prior to the year in
which the rights issue was completed. We expect leverage to have a positive relationship to the likelihood
of a change in ownership by 5 percentage points or more because, as discussed above, we expect leverage
to be negatively associated with minority investors' participation in a rights issue. In general, we expect
past performance to be positively associated with participation of minority shareholders in a rights issue.
Thus we expect higher past proﬁtability (measured by ROE) to be negatively associated with a 5-
percentage-point increase in promoter holdings subsequent to a rights issue.
For a givenﬁrm, the discount is the ratio of the difference between the price of a stock on the ex-rights date
and the issue price, and the price as of the ex-rights date. We expect the discount to be negatively related to
the likelihood of a change in promoter ownership of 5 percentage points or more. This is because deeper dis-
counts are likely to solicit greater participation by other shareholders.
We distribute ﬁrms into three buckets based on ownership level of promoters prior to the rights issue:
promoter shareholding between 15% and 25%, promoter shareholding greater than 25% but less than or
equal to 45%; and the rest. Recall that we exclude ﬁrms with a rights issue where the promoter's ownership
prior to the rights issue was less than 15%, because creeping acquisition rules do not apply to acquisitions
by promoters who own less than 15%.
The ﬁrst bucket— ownership between 15 and 25%— tries to isolate instanceswhere a promoter, at least on
paper, does not have enough votes to exert negative control, but is restricted from acquiringmore than 5% in a
year due to creeping acquisition provisions. The next bucket— ownership between 25 and 45%— isolates pro-
motes who have a large stake but their stake falls short of owning 50% of the votes that would give them abil-
ity to pass ordinary board resolutions without support from any other shareholder. As a caveat, it is well
established that the actual number of shares controlled by an Indian promoter are likely to be much larger
than the amount owned because promoters can routinely count on support from shares held by friends, fam-
ily, and ﬁnancial institutionswho tend to be passive shareholders and votewith the promoter (Verma, 1997).
Thus, the reported ownership level may not be reliable for purposes of examining promoters' incentives for
increasing their ownership in order to increase control.
Additionally, we introduce indicators for the post-2004 periodwhen long-term (i.e., holding periods ofmore
than 1 year) capital gains taxes were eliminated, which increased the incentives of retail investors to subscribe
to rights issues; industry controls; and an indicator variable for business group ownership. We also introduce
controls for whether a ﬁrm has indicated a project-speciﬁc purpose behind the rights issue, and conjecture
that for such ﬁrms the likelihood of increase in promoter shareholding by 5% or more is likely to be lower.
Table 10 shows the coefﬁcients aswell as themarginal impact of each variable for the logistic regressions. Size
of ﬁrms, as measured by the logarithm of assets in the previous period, is negatively related to the propensity of
large shareholding increase. First lag of the log of debt–equity ratio has a positive impact. The results conﬁrm that
the higher the discount, the less likely it is that the promoters' sharewill increase by 5 percentage points ormore.
Impact of ownership level is mixed. While prior ownership levels are correlated with propensity to in-
crease shareholding by more than 5 percentage points, none of the ownership buckets are signiﬁcant at con-
ventional levels. The results also show that a speciﬁc objective regarding a rights issue has a negative impact
on the likelihood of 5-percentage-point increase in ownership; however, the coefﬁcient is not statistically sig-
niﬁcant. Similarly, the coefﬁcient on lagged ROE is negative but not statistically signiﬁcant. The coefﬁcient for
the indicator variable for a ﬁrm belonging to a business group is positive and signiﬁcant, suggesting the
proclivity of business groups to try to use rights issues to get around creeping acquisition provisions.4.3. Discussion
Our results raise a fewquestions related tominority shareholders' and promoters' incentives to participate
in a rights issue. In particular: a)why aren'tminority shareholders taking advantage of discounted rights issue
Table 10
Logistic regression results for determining propensity of large changes in promoter shareholding for rights-issuing ﬁrms.
Dependent variable: Indicator for ≥5% change in promoter shareholding post-rights issue
Independent variables Model 1 Marginal
effect
Model 2 Marginal
effect
Model 3 Marginal
effect
Constant 3.546** 3.703*** 3.271**
[1.403] [1.402] [1.358]
First lag of log of assets −0.555** −0.113** −0.849*** −0.162*** −0.956*** −0.179***
[0.220] (0.0441) [0.272] (0.0448) [0.273] (0.0442)
First lag of log of debt–equity ratio 0.628** 0.128** 0.684** 0.130** 0.491 0.0919*
[0.272] (0.0532) [0.343] (0.0576) [0.319] (0.0540)
Discount −3.152*** −0.642*** −3.655*** −0.696*** −3.594** −0.673***
[1.159] (0.240) [1.417] (0.254) [1.472] (0.249)
Indicator for year N 2004 −0.505 −0.108 −0.224 −0.0438 −0.281 −0.0543
[0.696] (0.154) [0.678] (0.135) [0.694] (0.138)
Lagged value of return on equity −0.00513 −0.00104 −0.0121 −0.00230 −0.0160 −0.00299
[0.0108] (0.00219) [0.0120] (0.00230) [0.0126] (0.00240)
Speciﬁc reasons stated in objectives −0.530 −0.109 −0.558 −0.107 −0.458 −0.0864
[0.618] (0.125) [0.615] (0.117) [0.668] (0.126)
Indicator for initial promoter shareholding
between 15 and 25%
1.744 0.402 1.138 0.255
[1.378] (0.310) [1.371] (0.331)
Indicator for initial promoter shareholding
between 25 and 45%
1.162* 0.240* 1.169* 0.238*
[0.610] (0.126) [0.630] (0.129)
Indicator for belonging to a business group 1.313* 0.236** 1.569** 0.274**
[0.766] (0.118) [0.789] (0.117)
Agriculture industry 2.253* 0.508**
[1.282] (0.251)
Services industry 0.883 0.145
[0.923] (0.130)
Number of observations 78 78 78
Pseudo R-squared 0.165 0.236 0.257
Notes: The sample covers the period starting in 2002 and ending in 2008, and contains Business Groups and Stand-alone ﬁrms listed on
the Bombay Stock Exchange. Standard errors for our logistic regressions are contained in the parentheses. The omitted industry category
is Other Financial Services and Manufacturing combined, as one of these predict failure perfectly in the logistic regression. The indicator
for stating speciﬁc objectives is included here. In addition to the coefﬁcient estimates,we also report themarginal impact of the estimates,
and the resulting standard errors. Levels of signiﬁcance are indicated by asterisks: * represents signiﬁcance of coefﬁcient at the 10% level,
** represents signiﬁcance at the 5% level, and *** represents signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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that they already own substantial portions of the company? We address these issues in turn.
4.3.1. Shareholders' Incentives
Conceptually, rights issues shouldn't affect the distribution of ownership. For the promoters to be able to
increase their shareholding through rights issue, the minority shareholders will have to under-subscribe to
the issue, which will enable the promoters to subscribe to any shortfall by the remaining shareholders.
Given that rights issues, on average, are offered at substantial discounts, one would expect every shareholder
to subscribe to the issue in order to realize the resulting capital gains. In other words, even shareholders who
do not seek to increase their holdings of the rights-issuing ﬁrm on a long-term basis should participate to re-
alize the short-term gain of buying stock at a discount and then selling the same at a highermarket price sub-
sequent to the issue. Alternatively, in a well-functioning capital market, a shareholder could also simply sell
shares and the accompanying rights prior to the ex-rights date, and the buyer would then subscribe to the
rights issue. We posit that taxes and transaction cost most likely limit the ability of minority shareholders
to realize short-term gains associated with rights issues.
Transaction costs could limit the ability of shareholders to realize the discount associated with a rights
issue. This is especially true for individual shareholders who hold a relatively small number of shares.
While we are not aware of any studies that measure the transaction costs in the Indian securities market,
price bands established by SEBI for individual securities do provide some insight regarding transaction
costs. Price bands represent the maximum allowable change in the value of a security — any change greater
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tion regarding the reason for the price change and the authenticity of the transaction. The objective of the
price bands is to manage volatility and prevent spurious transaction (SEBI, 1997). The price band applicable
for warrants is 20% (National Stock Exchange of India Ltd, 2003). This suggests that a rights holder seeking
to sell the warrants that entitle purchase of additional shares could be asked to share a large fraction of the
discount with the broker and/or the buyer.
In addition, studies from countrieswith developed capitalmarkets could be used to shed some light on the
transaction costs involved in trading illiquid shares. Armitage (2007) estimates that there are substantial
transaction costs (measured in terms of half-touches, deﬁned as half of bid-asked spreads divided by average
of bid and asked price) even for institutional shareholders for rights-issuing shares in the UK, whichmakes it
difﬁcult for shareholders to trade shareswith discounted rights issue. As in the case of theUK,we alsoﬁnd that
the averagemarket capitalization of rights-issuingﬁrms is lower than that of the top 100 ﬁrms on the Bombay
Stock Exchange, and therefore, it is likely that trading in the rights-issuingﬁrms involves at least similar trans-
action costs. Because this detersmany shareholders from selling the additional shares accruing through rights
issue subsequently in the market, many such investors may choose not to subscribe to the rights issue. The
company, perhaps realizing this, goes ahead with the rights issue, with the expectation that not many shares
will be taken up, which will allow the promoters to increase their shareholding.
As discussed before, gains from sale of stock are subject to capital gains taxation. In India, prior to 2004,
short-term capital gains were taxed at the normal rate of ordinary income taxation, and long-term capital
gains (for shares held formore than a year)were taxed at a rate of 20%. Post-September 2004, short-term cap-
ital gains were taxed at 10% (subsequently increased to 15% from ﬁscal year 2008–09), and long-term capital
gains are not taxed provided a securities transaction tax (STT)12 has been paid beforehand. If STT has not been
paid, then long-term capital gains are taxed at a rate of 20%with indexation beneﬁts or at 10%without index-
ation beneﬁts.
Thus, shareholders seeking to realize a discount associatedwith a rights issuewould also need to take into
account the related tax impact. Given that the ﬁrst-in-ﬁrst-out rule13 is used in India for purposes of comput-
ing capital gains taxes, formany shareholders buying shares via a rights issue and selling themsubsequently is
likely to trigger signiﬁcant tax obligations. Given that tax rates, especially long-term tax rates, fell sharply in
2004, all else being equal, one would expect to see an increase in participation in rights issues by minority
shareholders. In other words, the change in the tax regime starting fromOctober 2004 should limit the extent
to which promoters can increase their ownership via a rights issue, as reduced taxes would reduce the cost of
buying shares via a rights issue and then selling the same number of shares in the secondary market. Table 5
corroborates our intuition. The table shows that for 2002, 2003 and 2004, the change in promoter ownership
following a rights issue was relatively large.4.3.2. Promoters' incentives
What incentives do promoters have to do a rights issue and/or concentrate even more shareholding? In
other words, why do promoters seek more control? As our results suggest, this incentive is at its highest
when the prior shareholding is somewhat low. In our opinion, in markets where there are private beneﬁts
of control, a controlling shareholder would have an incentive to raise money through a rights issue and to
undertake a project because the controlling shareholder would expect to realize private beneﬁts associated
with a project.
Another reason for controlling promoters to increase their shareholding through a rights issue could be to
support other ﬁrms in the same business group. For example, Gopalan et al. (2007) ﬁnd that Indian ﬁrms
belonging to business groups transfer capital internally to weaker ﬁrms in the group to help them avoid default
on external debts. Our ﬁnding is that Indian business group ﬁrms aremore likely to have an increased promoter
shareholding subsequent to rights issue. To the extent that such capital transfers are facilitatedwhen promoters12 STT is a tax on equity transactions. The tax rate is at most 0.125% of the value of a transaction, i.e., the transaction price multiplied by
the number of shares transacted. See, for instance, http://www.smartmoneyindia.co.cc/2009/01/all-about-securities-transaction-tax.
html.
13 First-in-ﬁrst-out (FIFO) is used to determine cost basis of shares. FIFO rule presumes that the oldest shares are sold ﬁrst. I.e., suppose
someone acquired 200 shares in two separate 100-share transactions, say in 2002 and 2003. Then, in 2005 the person sells 100 shares.
According to the FIFO principle of computing capital gains, the cost of the 100 shares soldwill be the cost of acquiring 100 shares in 2002.
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when they control the company.
Finally, if the promoters have inside information about the prospects of the controlled ﬁrm, they have
incentives to increase their shareholding. Rights issues offer a cheap way to raise capital for the company's
projects and, in many instances, also lead to increases in promoter shareholding. When the company
rebounds, the promoters reap larger beneﬁts due to a higher shareholding.4.3.3. Policy implications
Regulators such as SEBI are obviously concerned about improving corporate governance and protecting
the rights of minority shareholders. In fact, regulations related to creeping acquisitions are an attempt to pro-
tect the rights ofminority shareholders frompromoterswhomay seek to time increases in stake based on pri-
vate information. Our study provides evidence for relatively signiﬁcant increases in promoters' interest
following a rights issue. While, clearly, not all rights issues are motivated by promoters seeking to increase
their stake at discounted prices, there is anecdotal evidence that indeed, some promoters do try to use rights
issue as a mechanism to increase their shareholding. For example, in the case of the rights issue by Pentagon
Global Solutions, a number of news articles mentioned that the purpose of the issue was to allow the pro-
moters to increase their stake14; in the case of Hitachi's rights issue, SEBI required the company to make an
open offer to all shareholders after irregularities concerning acquisition of shares by promoters surfaced fol-
lowing the rights issue (Express India, 2004). More recent anecdotal evidence also suggests that, even in
2012 and 2013, rights issues were being used by promoters to increase their stake. Speciﬁcally, following a
rights issue in 2012 by EPC Industrié Limited (“EPC”) — a ﬁrm belonging to the Mahindra & Mahindra
Group — the promoter's stake increased from 38.1% to 54.8%. In fact, an Economic Times news story dated
June 20, 2012 covering the EPC rights issue stated that, “rights issues have proved to be a convenient route
for promoters to strengthen their holdings as acquisition of shares through rights is not subject to take-
over guidelines, according to investment bankers.”15 Similarly, a large increase in promoter holdings followed
the rights issue by Kesoram Industries in 2013.16 So, areminority shareholders being harmedby rights issues?
We offer some evidence that this is indeed the case. Marisetty et al. (2008) show that while the price reaction
to a rights issue is generally neutral, it is signiﬁcantly negative for a business group ﬁrm. Jijo Lukose and Rao
(2003) show that the long-term performance of rights-issuing ﬁrms, measured in terms of abnormal returns,
are alsoworse relative to ﬁrmswithout a rights issue. Following Loughran and Ritter (1997), we compare the
average return on equity and return on assets of rights-issuing ﬁrms. Speciﬁcally, we compare the average of
the return on equity and return on assets over a three-year period following the rights issue.17 Table 11A
shows that the return on equity and the return on assets of rights-issuing ﬁrms are lower than those of com-
parable ﬁrms. This difference is both statistically and economically signiﬁcant. The table also shows that the
underperformance is entirely driven by ﬁrms that do not provide speciﬁc objectives in connection with a
rights issue.
Next, we compare the stock price performance of rights-issuingﬁrms to that of their peers. Speciﬁcally, for
a given rights-issuing ﬁrm, we compute the difference between its stock returns and those of its peer group
over a 3-month, one-year and three-year period starting from the ex-rights date. We restrict this analysis
to ﬁrms that traded consistently during the three-year period starting from the ex-rights date, and to ﬁrms
that had a price of at least Rs. 5 on the ex-rights date. Thus, a negative number indicates that the rights-
issuing ﬁrm underperformed its peers. Overall, Table 11B shows that, consistent with results of other studies,
stock returns of rights-issuing ﬁrms underperform the returns of similar but non-rights-issuing ﬁrms. And
with respect to stock price returns, the underperformance is not affected by the distinction between rights
issues with and without speciﬁc objectives.
Our results suggest that SEBI should pay particular attention to rights issues, particularly issues with non-
speciﬁc objectives. As choices increase regarding the ability of ﬁrms to raise capital, it seems important from a14 See, for instance, “Why Pentagon Global is Making Rights Issue?” Dalal Street Investment Journal, December 1, 2002.
15 See, for instance, “Mahindra & Mahindra raises stake in EPC Industries via rights,” Vijay Gaurav, Economic Times, June 20, 2012,
accessed on Nov. 2, 2014.
16 See “Kesoram Industries set for makeover, promoters hike stake,” Business Today, July 31, 2013, accessed on Nov. 2, 2014.
17 We restrict to rights-issuing ﬁrms that had their issues by 2006. This enables us to study ﬁrms for at least three years after the rights
issuance, and the average performance over this 3-year period is taken as the long-term performance.
Table 11A
Comparison of returns of rights-issuing ﬁrms with comparison ﬁrms.
Variable Firm type Overall Rights-issuing ﬁrms with
speciﬁc objectives
Rights-issuing ﬁrms with
non-speciﬁc objectives
Values T-test of
difference
[p-value]
Sample
size
Values T-test of
difference
[p-value]
Sample
size
Values T-test of
difference
[p-value]
Sample
size
Mean
Return on equity Rights issue
ﬁrms
6.17 5.14 60 13.02 −1.12 25 1.14 9.73 35
Comparison
ﬁrms
11.31 [0.014]** 60 11.9 [0.67] 25 10.87 [0.0007]*** 35
Return on assets Rights issue
ﬁrms
5.16 2.77 60 9.27 −1.02 25 2.07 5.62 35
Comparison
ﬁrms
7.93 [0.057]* 60 8.25 [0.58] 25 7.69 [0.006]*** 35
Median
Return on equity Rights issue
ﬁrms
8.85 60 10.78 25 4.2 35
Comparison
ﬁrms
11.68 [0.01]*** 60 13.18 [0.58] 25 10.87 [0.03]** 35
Return on assets Rights issue
ﬁrms
5.72 60 7.87 25 2.85 35
Comparison
ﬁrms
7.93 [0.077]* 60 9.46 [0.59] 25 7.51 [0.03]** 35
Notes: Parametric and non-parametric tests on mean and median comparisons of rights issue and comparison ﬁrms. For each rights-
issuing ﬁrm, comparable ﬁrms that meet the following criteria are selected: : 1) the ﬁrm should not have issued equity on a rights
basis between 2002 and 2008; 2) the ﬁrm should be listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange and be in the same industry as deﬁned by
Prowess; 3) the ﬁrm should have sales that are within 40% of the revenues of the rights-issuing companies in at least two of the years
2001–2008; and 4) the ﬁrm should be of the same type (i.e., Stand-alone or Business Group) as the rights-issuing ﬁrm. We compute
the average of return on equity and return on assets for at least 3 years, so we restrict rights issue ﬁrms to b2006 (which leaves us
with 60 rights-issuing ﬁrms in the sample). We perform a two-sided test of hypothesis that the rights issue ﬁrms don't underperform
vis-a-vis comparator ﬁrms against the alternative that they do. Further, we categorize rights-issuing ﬁrms (and their comparison
ﬁrms) to be those with speciﬁc objectives if their planned expenses were clearly identiﬁed to the extent of at least 50% of the
overall money raised. Means comparison tests and nonparametric median tests are both reported. The asterisks indicate the following:
* — signiﬁcant at 10% level; ** — signiﬁcant at 5% level; *** — signiﬁcant at 1% level.
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the extent that controlling shareholders are making decisions with the objective of increasing their stake,
the interest of theminority shareholders may be harmed. The recent increase inmergers and acquisitions ac-
tivity in India also increases the potential for controlling shareholders to extract beneﬁts of control for them-
selves at the expense of minority shareholders.
Oneway to prevent promoters from trying to use rights issues as amechanism for increasing their stake in
a ﬁrm would be for regulators to incorporate all or part of the increase in promoters' ownership following aTable 11B
Comparison of returns of stock prices of rights-issuing ﬁrms with comparison ﬁrms.
3-month return 1-year return 3-year return Number of
observations
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Combined −11.41%** −10.86% −13.50% −13.20% −34.89% −27.46% 52
[A] Firms without speciﬁc reasons −10.63% −11.30% 8.49% −10.97% −33.61% −36.86% 27
[B] Firms with speciﬁc reasons −12.25%** −9.71% −37.24%** −14.28% −36.27% −16.31% 25
[C] Difference between speciﬁc and
non-speciﬁc ﬁrms ([B] − [A])
−1.61% 1.58% −45.73%** −3.32% −2.66% 20.55%
The ﬁgures represent the difference between the return of the rights offering ﬁrm and the average return of its selected peers over the
given time period. Companies whose adjusted stock price on the date of the exchange rights offering was less than Rs. 5 have been
omitted. The asterisks indicate the following: * — signiﬁcant at 10% level; ** — signiﬁcant at 5% level; *** — signiﬁcant at 1% level.
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to providing disincentives to promoters from trying to game the system, such a policy may also improve re-
source allocation, as it may limit the extent to which promoters can fund projects with large private beneﬁts
with rights issues.
5. Conclusion
In this study, we systematically analyze rights issues by Indian ﬁrms from 2002 through 2008 to ascertain
the extent to which promoters of Indian ﬁrmsmay be using rights issues as a way to circumvent rules related
to creeping acquisitions. We document that the number of rights issues in a given period, at least partially,
seems to be driven by SEBI's regulations concerning creeping acquisitions. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that during
the period when SEBI increased the creeping acquisition limit from 5% to 10%, the number of rights issues de-
clined, only to increasewhen SEBI changed the rules to again limit creeping acquisition to 5 percentage points.
Regression results that controlled for ﬁrms' characteristics showed that promoters of Indian ﬁrms, especially
promoters of ﬁrms belonging to a business group, had a tendency to realize increases in ownership subse-
quent to a rights issue. We also ﬁnd evidence that is consistent with the intent of promoters to use rights is-
sues to increase ownership stake. In particular, we ﬁnd evidence that suggests that promoters may be using
rights issues with non-speciﬁc objectives to recover loss in ownership stake. We also ﬁnd that promoters of
business groupﬁrms aremore disposed towards rights issueswith non-speciﬁc objectives. Finally, we present
evidence that the likelihood of a 5-percentage-point increase in a year following a rights issue was higher for
ﬁrms belonging to a business group.
Given that other studies (Bertrand et al., 2002) have documented that promoters of ﬁrms belonging to
Indian business groups transfer assets across ﬁrms within the group in a way that beneﬁts the promoters at
the expense of theminority shareholders, SEBImaywant tomonitor increases in ownership following a rights
issue more closely, especially rights issues with non-speciﬁc objectives. Further, given the fact that rights is-
sues in India are priced at signiﬁcant discounts to the price at which the stock of the issuing company is trad-
ing, it may be useful for future research to explore the extent to which promoters use rights issues in advance
of certain transactions, such as mergers or spin-offs, to disproportionately beneﬁt from the expected transac-
tion. Promoters of Indian ﬁrms have also been using their stakes as collateral to raise debt.
Oneway that SEBI may be able to reduce the use of rights issues by promoters to increase their stakes is to
consider some fraction of the increase in holdings following a rights issue as creeping acquisition. Such a
change, coupled with the recent disclosure requirements related to pledging of shares by promoters, would
likely reduce the incentive for promoters to use rights issues as a tool for increasing their shareholdings.
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